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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS:
A POLICY ANALYSIS1
By
Elizabeth Steiner Maccia
1. Introduction
1. My position in this paper is not one of advocacy but one of analysis.
There is no need for a philosopher to reinforce the voices of women. Nor
am I here in a position of the compleat analyst. There is no need for a
philosopher to reinforce the voices of scientists and other non-philosophic
analysts.

I am here as one whose intellectual loyalty is to the pursuit of

logical and moral illumination.
2. In the pursuit of logical illumination, I shall attempt to explicate
policy, policy analysis, and affirmative action plans. In the pursuit of
moral illumination, I shall discuss the policy of affirmative action relative
to the kind of society in which we want to live and the kind of men and
women we wish to see nurtured in such a society.
2. The Nature of Policy*
1. Social organizations emerge wherever there are groups of persons.
Some of them are informal and some are formal. Formal social organizations
are instituted to achieve certain goals. An example of a non-institution
would be the family; of an institution, the university. Whether a social
organization is formal or informal, it is characterized by structure, i.e.,

*In clarifying my ideas about policy and policy analysis, of help were
the following: S. Ballinger, "The Nature and Function of Educational Policy"
Cl); H.S. Bhola, "The Design of (Educational) Policy: Directing and Harnessing
Social Power for Social Outcomes" (2); A.S. Clayton, "The Organization of the
School of Education, Indiana University for Policy Development" (3) and "The
Relevance of Philosophy of Education to Questions of Educational Policy" (4);
and P.G. Smith, "On Policy" (16).
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a "specific relational system of interaction among individuals and collectivities" (9), and by culture, i.e., "transmitted and created content and patterns
of values, ideas, and other symbolic-meaningful systems" (9). Structure gives
rise to positioning of individuals and collectivities in the group and so to
status, while culture—the shared beliefs and orientations—provides guides
for the conduct of members in the group and so gives rise to role. Status
and role, of course, are not independent of one another, for structure and
culture interact. For instance, an authoritative role leads to a superordinate position, and a superordinate position to an authoritative role. Hence,
the official capacity to exercise control depends upon both structure and
culture. The powerful and produced by culture and are producers of culture.
2. Since institutions are to achieve certain goals, they can by defined
by the constitutive rules for acts taken to embody such achievement. For
instance, just as chess is constituted by the rules which are essential for
one? player either capturing or checking another player's king, so a university
is constituted by the rules which are essential for the promotion of learning.
The constitutive rules of an institution, therefore, prescribe its structure
and culture.

Such rules create offices and roles, regulate procedures, and

assign rights and duties.
3. "Rule," according to Black* (3), has four main senses: instruction,
regulation, precept, and principle. A rule as an instruction is a direction,
and so expresses a command whose form is S do A where 1Sf stands for a subject and 'A' for an action. There is no modality in the sense of the action
being required, forbidden, or permitted. A rule as regulation is lawlike,
and so expresses a prescription whose form is S to do A. The 'to do' adds
the modal element. A rule as precept is a rule of prudence or of morality,
and so expresses a normative whose form is S ought to do A.

*It should be noted that my exposition of the four senses of "Rule"
deviates from that of Black.
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Even though both the regulation and the precept involve a prescription, in
the case of the precept neither is there a sense of enforcing, rescinding, or
reinstating the rule nor does the rule have a history. Finally, a rule as
principle is a covering rule for either instructions or regulations or
precepts. The fourth sense of rule, therefore, is a sense of rule that is
a more general sense relative to one of the other three senses. It is patent
that constitutive rules which define institutions are regulations not instructions; constitutive rules are instituted, and so have authorship and lawlikeness. Whether constitutive rules are also precepts depends upon whether
institutions have intrinsic and instrumental worth. A good and effective
constitutive rule is more than a regulation; it is also a precept.
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4. Institutions, of course, can be further organized. That is to say,
social organizations can arise in which institutions are the collectivities
that are related within a context of shared beliefs.

Such supra-institutions

also are defined through constitutive rules. Government is an obvious
example of a supra-institution. Those institutions taken to be in the public
sector are the collectivities related in government.
5. Although 'policy' relates to the term 'political' and thereby brings
to mind governmental constitutive rules, I shall use 'policy' in a wider
sense than public policy. I shall use

'policy' also for the constitutive

rules of other societal institutions whether they be supra-institutions or
not. The justification of so using 'policy' is lack of logical difference
between constitutive rules of government and other societal institutions.

Contemporary usage of 'policy' as in 'educational policy' and 'Marietta
College's Faculty Hiring Policy', and ancient usage of 'polis', the Greek
etymon of 'policy' which extended affairs of state beyond the governmental,
also do not restrict one's use to public policy.
6. Schema 1 presents a partial summary of this section of the paper
on the nature of policy. The relation between the kinds of rules and the
kinds of policy is presented.
3. Policy Analysis
1. Policy can be analyzed from many perspectives. The analysis in
section 2 above was a logical one. The nature of policy was presented
through a discussion of its order, i.e., its form, content, and function.
It was found that policy is the regulations that define an institution by
prescribing its structure and culture. This, of course, is a general analysis
of policy.* One also could specify the form, content, and function of
different institutions' policies.

In the course of such specification,

policy that is implicit would be made explicit. If comparisons were made
between policies, then comparative as well as descriptive analysis would
take place. Not only would institutions be described, but they would also
be compared.

__
DIRECTIONS
(S do A)

RULE:
PRECEPTS

(S ought to do
REGULATIONS
(S to do A)

POLICIES
...t
'NON-PRECEPTS

Schema 1: Kinds of Rules Related to Kinds of Policy

*To be more precise, a logical analysis is a meta-analysis.
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2. Since policy is instituted, policy is formulated (not always
explicitly) and sometimes implemented (not all policy is operative). There
are many aspects of policy formulation and implementation to be analyzed by
the behavioral scientist. One aspect of interest to psychologists and
sociologists is conflict within the process. Different persons and collectivities within an institution can disagree. Moreover, institutions within
institutions can. Obviously the decision-making aspect of the instituting
of policy is of interest to the political scientist. Power distribution
and execution are there to be analyzed.*
3. Besides logical, descriptive, comparative, and behavioral scientific
analysis of policy, there is normative analysis of policy. This kind of
analysis consits in determining whether the constitutive rules defining an
institution are more than regulations. As stated in 2.3, regulations also
m y be precepts. Because precepts may be either rules of morality or rules
of prudence, both philosophical and praxiological analyses are required.
Philosophical analysis directs itself to questions of morality relative to
policy. Questions as to the justness of an institution which are questions
as to the justness of its policy are such questions. On the other hand,
praxiological analysis** directs itself to questions of prudence relative to
policy. Questions as to the effectiveness of institutional regulations to
bring about institutional ends are such questions.
4. The historical perspective is yet another one from which to analyze
policy.

Institutions do have histories, and so one can attempt to explain

changes in their constitutive rules.
*A perspective that permits unification of psychological, sociological
and political analyses of institutions is general systems theory. See E.S.
Maccia and G.S. Maccia, "Use of SIGGS Theory Model to Characterize Educational
Systems as Social Systems." (10)
**Praxiology is the science of practices, i.e., of means-ends relationship. See James E. Perry's dissertation, On the Significance of Praxiology
for the Study of Education for a more comprehensive account of praxiology (12).
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5. The final type of policy analysis to be distinguished is more than
analysis. It is analysis directed toward the development of policy. As
stated by Y. Dror who has delineated developmental policy analysis:
One weakness of the term "analysis" is Its calculative-logical
connotation. In policy analysis a very important part of the
job is to invent new alternatives and to engage in creative and
Imaginative thinking. Nevertheless, I prefer a concept which
somewhat understates the role rather than too presumptuous,
too "political," and too frightening a term, such as "policy
adviser" or "policy consultant," (6)
Such developmental analysis can be framed within the systems analytic paradigm
provided the paradigm is extended beyond its usual quantitative limits and
it incorporates the political phenomenon of decision-making. (6,11)
6. Schema 2 summarizes the above discussion of policy analysis. The
types of policy analysis are set forth in the diagram.

Logical Analysis of Affirmative Action Plans
1. Executive Order 11246 is directed toward all universities and colleges
with Federal contracts or subcontracts and requires of them compliance with
that order. Consequently, Higher Education Guidelines—Executive Order 11246
is a written public policy. It consists of regulations which are principles
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to be specified further by those universities and colleges that fall within
the Federal domain due to their Federal contracts or subcontracts.
2. The function of Executive Order 11246 can be explicated through
consideration of its two central concepts: non-discrimination and affirmative action. Non-discrimination requires that "no person may be denied
employment or related benefits on grounds of his or her race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." (7) Affirmative action, as the phrase indicates,
requires more than a passive stance of non-discrimination; it requires deeds
that rectify inequality of opportunity due to discrimination. Employment
for groups that traditionally have been discriminated against in higher
education, i.e., employment for women and minorities, is called for. "Minorities
are defined by the Department of Labor as Negroes, Spanish-surnamed, American
Indians, and Orientals." (7) As part of its affirmative action requirement,
a contractor university or college must "determine whether women and
minorities are "underutilized" in its employee work force and, if that is
the case, to develop as part of its affirmative action program specific goals
and timetables designed to overcome that underutilization.T (7)
3. In order to specify the public policy of non-discrimination and
affirmative action, the universities and colleges falling under Executive
Order 1124 6 must set forth a plan which contains more than a statement of
commitment to equal employment opportunity and a statement of goals and when
they are to be realized. The commitment to equal employment opportunity must
be detailed through personnel policies, e.g., policies of recruitment, hiring,
assignment, training, promotion, anti-nepotism, etc. The goals and timetables must be supported through data on the respective university's or
college's work force and on the availability of women and minorities for that
work force. Not only must affirmative action be planned to increase numbers
of women and minorities in the work force, but also to rectify any discrimination within the work force, e.g., discrimination as reflected in salaries.
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To ensure that policies will not remain inoperative, plans must include
evaluative mechanisms as well as disseminative ones.
4. Before turning to an analysis of the moral legitimacy of affirmative
action plans, it should be pointed out that, even though it be granted that
goals are quotas, public policy does not demand hiring of non-qualified
personnel by institutions of higher learning. J. Stanley Pottinger, former
Director of the Office of Civil Rights, argued that goals were not quotas.
Quotas, on the one hand, imply a numerical level of employment
that must be met. If quotas were required, they would be rigid
requirements, and their effects would be to compel employment decisions to fulfill them, regardless of the compromising effect
fulfillment might have on legitimate qualifications and standards,
regardless of the good faith effort made to fulfill them, and
regardless of the fact that quotas might have been set by arbitrary
standards unrelated to the availability of capable applicants and
the potential of the contractor to recruit them.
Goals, on the other hand, signify a different concept and a
different employment process. They are projected levels of
achievement resulting from an analysis by a contractor of his
deficiencies, and of what he believes he can do about them.
Establishing goals signifies both that the contractor has made
such an analysis, and that he has committed himself to good
faith to meet them. (13)
Sidney Hook, however, argues that goals are quotas.
What is the logical or cognitive difference between saying
(1) "You are to aim at a quota of 20% redheads for your staff
within two years," and (2) "You are to set as your goal re=
cruitment of 20% redheads for your staff within two years?"
Quotas are numerical goals. A "quota of 20%" is equivalent to
"a numerical goal of 20%." The expressions are interchangeable.
The cognitive meaning of neither sentence is altered if we substitute one expression for the other. (8)
He goes on to place his argument in the context of remarks such as Pottinger's.
Spokesmen of HEW seek to absolve themselves of the guilt of
seeking to impose a quota system by insisting on a distinction
that makes no difference in fact or practice. "We don't demand," they plead, "that the numerical goals we set down
actually be achieved. We ask only that a good faith effort
be made to achieve it." How does this differ from saying,
"We don't demand that the quotas actually be filled or
reached, only that you honestly try?" (8)
Stated this way, goals and quotas do not differ. But there is a difference
between demanding compliance and calling for an honest try.
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To call for an honest try is to give the necessary leeway for not hiring
women and minorities who are not capable of functioning in a university, i.e.,
functioning to promote learning. While it might be, as Hook states it,
"natural.. .to reduce standards in order to establish good faith in the quest
for numerical goals or quotas" (8), it is not demanded by public policy.
Even its naturalness or what happens in practice is open to question. An
answer depends upon praxiological, behavioral scientific, and descriptive
analyses of affirmative action plans. 'Perhaps the Indian experience in
using quotas to achieve social justice can shed sane light upon the matter.
Paul Seabury asserts that this experience shows that quotas and preferences
lead to extremes of absurdity. Some absurdities noted by him are:
So-called "backward classes" proliferated to the point where
it became necessary to be designated as "backward" in order
to become privileged. And, indeed, in 1964, a "Backwardness
Commission" recommended in the state of Mysore that every
group except two (the Brahmins and the Lingayats) be officially
designated as backward! (15)
In Kanpur, recently, the son of a wealthy Jat family applied
for admission to the Indian Institute of Technology and was
rejected on objective criteria; then he reapplied as a member
of an ethnically-scheduled caste, and on this basis was admitted. (15)
5. Philosophical Analysis of Affirmative Action Plans
1. All would admit that we want to live in a just society. But all do
not agree as to what a just society is. Some would hold utilitarianism and
take the just society to be one in which its institutions maximize the net
balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to the
group. But surely each individual has an inviolability that cannot be overridden by the welfare of the group. Also some would hold that all individuals
should be treated equally. But surely there are differences in individuals.
By accepting a Kantian position on justice, such as Rawls' (14), both inviolability and differences need not be set aside and communality is possible.
2. Kant's categorical imperative stated as the principle of universality:
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Act only on the maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will
that it should become a universal law
sets forth that subjective choosing ought to be objective. Thus, this
principle is a normalcy one for rational beings. It is a requirement for
being rational. The stating of the categorical imperative as the principle
of autonomy:
So act that the will could at the same time regard itself as
giving in its maxims universal laws
makes clear that subjective choosing which is objective is also a will conditioning itself or a good will. Thus, this principle establishes liberty.
It is a requirement for freedom. Finally, the stating of the categorical
imperative as the principle of humanity:
So act that in your own person as well as in the person of every
other you are treating mankind also as an end, never merely as
a means
makes subjective choosing which is objective respect for the self. Thus,
this principle establishes inviolability.

It is a requirement for communality.

All together these principles are the categorical imperative which is the
basis for rational conference and agreement, i.e., for fairness.
3. Rawls sets forth two principles of social justice that he takes to
be chosen by human beings who are rational.
First: each person is to have equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. (14)
Rawls restates the second principle to clarify that a difference principle
operates as well as a principle of equality of opportunity:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (14)
These two principles set forth the policy for society's assignment of rights
and duties and for the distribution of social and economic advantages.

11

This policy is not simply regulative but is also moral precept. Consequently,
Rawls' two principles are a basis for philosophical analysis of policy.
4. Since affirmative action plans specify policy about the distribution
of social and economic advantages, philosophical analysis will be in terms
of rawls' second principle. This principle is not one of redress in the
sense of requiring society to try to compensate for inequalities so that
everyone on a fair basis could compete with everyone else. However, the
second principle does demand recognition that the advantaged are not to gain
because of their native assets or social circumstances but because of benefiting the disadvantaged. The advantaged are not deserving of greater social
and economic rewards than the disadvantaged, inequalities of birth or
station are not merited. Hence, no one should gain or lose from one's
arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or social circumstances
without gaining or receiving compensatory advantages in return. In other words,
the second principle is an agreement to share in the benefits of the distribution of natural talents whatever it might be. Rationality, therefore, is
non-supportive of either a meritocracy or a technocracy. These are unjust
social arrangements.

Still, the second principle does not perpetuate the

status quo. Earlier generations owe to later generations the implementation
of policies, including eugenic ones, which will, if it can be done, move the
society toward equal talent.
5. Patently, the affirmative action plans constitute policy that is
moral as well as regulative. The second principle of justice is embodied in
the two basic concepts of affirmative action plans, non-discrimination and
affirmative action. Non-discrimination relates to the principle of equal
opportunity, while affirmative action relates to the principle of difference.
By not discriminating on the basis of characteristics non-qualifying for promoting learning, equal opportunity for employment within universities and
colleges is possible.
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By actually hiring women and minorities qualified to promote learning, talents
formerly unavailable result in benefit for all.
6. Sidney Hook has called affirmative action plans immoral on the
grounds that the affirmative action part of the plans is discriminatory.
For some purposes—trade, immigration policy, rationing of
scarce commodities, etc.— a quota system may be legitimate.
But when we are seeking the best qualified person or persons'
for a position it is never morally legitimate, particularly
when we are on record as being opposed in principle to discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex or national
origin except when these are justifiably among the qualifications, e.g., sex for certain kinds of dancers or officers
for women's detention centers, religion for service in house
worship, etc. (8)
Obviously, Hook is mistaken. Affirmative action does not make sex or race or
national origin qualifications for promoting learning. Women and minorities
are scheduled to be hired to demonstrate that being a non-minority and male
are not qualifications.

But what if qualified non-minority men are not

hired? For example, the Female and Minority Program at the University of
Minnesota was discontinued due to complaints of reverse discrimination which
were made to the state human rights commission. The F & M Program opened
higher paying administrative and professional jobs first to women and minorities. In one year and a half, 133 F 8 M jobs were filled, and only 43
of them finally by white males. (17) Again the problem is not with affirmative
action. Rather the problem is one of allocating resources to hire nonminority men as well as women and minorities.
7. Given the budgetary crunch in higher education, firing not hiring,
whether it be affirmative action hiring or not, faces us. If a society
cannot give opportunity to its members, then that society must be reordered
for justice's sake. Public policy relative to resource reallocation is
required.

Resources must be reallocated from that which is destructive of

human spirit to that which is not. Only in the context of such public
policy can affirmative action plans further the just society.
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